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This article first examines the relationship between the postmodern deconstruction of
representation and recent post-truth politics. It discusses to what extent the “hyper-
reality of simulacra” (Baudrillard) has become an instrument of power in recent auto-
cratic policies. In return, it explores an alternative way of thinking of “the real.” The basic
thesis is that the real has its own force. Therefore, it is able to represent itself, that is, to
reject certain signs as well as to demand them. However, the concept of representation
proposed here does not fall back on the separation of subject and object typical for
classical representation theory. Accordingly, the real is not to be understood as an ob-
jective counterpart to which we direct ourselves. Rather, it is a continuous founding
process, more precisely, a surplus movement that lets us and all beings be. By genetically
flowing through all things, it allows them to show themselves from themselves, thus
counteracting the distortions tied to their appearing like a bad but unavoidable coun-
terweight.
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1. Modernism and Postmodernity
As Pericles Lewis suggests in hisCambridge Introduction toModernism, the crisis
of representation is in the first place an aesthetic problem.1 Since Romanticism at
the latest,2 words and images have stopped simply depicting reality. Instead, they
1 Lewis, Pericles, “Introduction”, in Lewis, Pericles (ed.), The Cambridge Introduc-
tion to Modernism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2007, 3–10.
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become increasingly self-referential by reflecting their depicting function. That is,
the meaning of words and images is no longer generated by an “external” refer-
ence, but rather by the fact that they refer to each other, and they in turn represent
this relationship. Georg Luk'cs already diagnosed the problems associated with
this in his Theory of the Novel of 1920: “We have invented the creation of forms:
and that is why everything that falls from our weary and despairing hands must
always be incomplete.”3
Poststructuralist theory – from Saussure to Barthes, Baudrillard, Derrida,
Foucault and Lyotard, to name only the most prominent names – took up this
specificity of modern literature and art most profoundly and continued it by
transferring it to theoretical thinking. In this essay I will refer mainly to Foucault
and Derrida. In The Order of Things, for example, Foucault explicitly places his
archaeology in the line of Mallarm*!s poetry.4 Along this line he advances to the
actual core topic of his study, namely how language, in the course of the Classical
age and up to the 19th century, is no longer linked to signification, but rather to
representation and discursivity; while in the 20th century it also loses its con-
nection to representation and becomes fragmented.5
Derrida, for his part, also maintains a strong relationship with literary mod-
ernism. Besides Mallarm*, his reference authors include Artaud, Blanchot,
Celan, Char, and Kafka. Under the auspices of diff(rance, he establishes that
“signs represent the present in its absence; they take the place of the present;”6 in
such a way that signs continually and persistently refer to more signs, while these
signs again refer to yet other signs, and so on. Thus, what lies outside of signs,
appears only as something withdrawn within signs referring to each other.
Within postmodern theory, the notion of the crisis of representation becomes
even more complex because it offers both a comprehensive category of inter-
pretation as well as serving as a critical instrument. As a category of interpretation,
the “crisis of representation” not only transforms the problem of modern aes-
thetics into a formal problem that has to do with the theory of signs or discourse
theory. Rather, it applies the aesthetic and formal theoretical problem to the
modern way of life in general. From this perspective, the modern order of life is
fundamentally characterized by a crisis of representation that extends from the
individual relationship with the world to the political system of government.
Baudrillard perhaps addressed this most consistently when speaking of a com-
2 First beginnings can already be found in the SpanishClassical period. Cervantes and
Vel'zquez are well-known examples.
3 Luk'cs, Georg, The Theory of the Novel, London, The Merlin Press 1971, 33.
4 Foucault, Michel, The Order of Things, London. An Archeology of the Human
Sciences, New York, Routledge 1989, 332–333.
5 Foucault, The Order of Things, 306–307.
6 Derrida, Jacques, Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl!s Theory of
Signs, Evanston, Northwestern University Press 1973, 139.
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prehensive “substitution of the real with signs of the real” or of a “hyper-reality of
simulacra.”
By contrast, the “crisis of representation” serves as a critical instrument where
it is used to question or even delegitimizemodern subjectivity. One can think here
of Derrida!s criticism of “Western logocentrism” and “the metaphysics of pres-
ence.” In return, he emphasizes language as a continuous process of shifts of
meaning. Or one can think again of Foucault, who analyzes subjectivity as a
specific game of signs organized by power. Subjectivity, once the promoter of the
proud Enlightenment project, turns out to be a mere ensemble of knowledge,
norms and self-practices that in itself lacks any substantiality. The historical a
priori of discourse replaces the transcendental-subjective a priori, valid fromKant
to Husserl.
2. Ugly Grimaces
It can hardly be denied that the “crisis of representation” was successful as a
critical instrument, especially when it comes to processes of decolonization and
the dismantling of gender hierarchies. Yet at present it may seem that this has
come to an end, more precisely as if the critical forces of the crisis of repre-
sentation have just exhausted themselves. Here I deliberately do not address the
current situation of postcolonial studies or gender discourse, for this would re-
quire a differentiated discussion of its own.7 Instead, let us stick to the sphere of
simple and relatively unmediated power, that is, the sphere of political power. In
his 1995 essay Theorie des Ideologischen (Theory of the Ideological) Wolfgang
Fritz Haug, who, from a Marxist position, remained critical of postmodern dis-
course throughout, speaks of the “age of digital processing” as the “Berlusconi
age […], in which the media power is finally preparing to diminish the reality of
the referent into a connotation of the imaginary.”8 In Haug!s sense, one could say
that with Berlusconi the crisis of representation comes true completely, for it has
now seized power over the political and social status quo. The reason for this is
that those who have the unconditional “will to power” have appropriated the
crisis of representation and turned it into a strategy for their own benefit. They
have learned that the only thing that matters is to impose signs – words and
7 As good examples see Seeßlen, Georg, “Semantical Healing”, in: jungle.world 43/
2015; Roedig, Andrea, “Über Begriffsdrachen”, in: der Freitag.
8 Own translation. The German text reads: “Das Zeitalter der digitalen Bearbeitung
[ist] das Berlusconizeitalter, in dem die Medienmacht sich anschickt, endlich den Ref-
erenten Wirklichkeit zu einer Konnotation des Imaginären herabzusetzen.” Haug,
Wolfgang Fritz, “Theorie des Ideologischen”, in: Bay, Hansjörg / Hamann, Christof
(eds.), Ideologie nach ihrem #Ende! : Gesellschaftskritik zwischen Marxismus und Post-
moderne, Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag 1995, 47 (42–63).
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images, and their spectacular m*lange – against other signs. There is no outside of
signs, for the opposition between the signified and the signifier has long since been
deconstructed. What may lie beyond signification is strangely reminiscent of the
medieval concept of primematter. Having no features of its own, neither impetus
nor effect, it can be relentlessly deployed for power-strategic purposes. Following
Giorgio Agamben!sHomo Sacer project, we can say: this is the “mere life” of us
all, this is our zoe.
Twenty years afterHaug!s essay,Berlusconismhas reached the heights ofworld
politics. In line with his politics of “alternative facts,” US President Trump has
ceased to follow the imperative of credibility, respectability, and decency, which
used to be binding for the heads of representative democracies. Other autocrats
such as Putin or the boards of the major sports associations IOC and FIFA have
never cared about democratic procedures anyway. However, their audacity has
also reached a new level. Just think of how the IOC and the Russian state power
under Putin dealt with the Russian doping problem during the 2014 Winter
Olympics in Sochi; not to mention other cases of ubiquitous corruption. What is
disturbing is that the lies of these actors are well documented in themedia and yet
they continue to act as if nothing had ever been documented. In continuation of
another motive from Agamben, this time from his commentary on St. Paul!s
Letter to the Romans, one can speak here of a suspension or depositioning
(Entsetzung), namely of a depositioning of lie (Entsetzung der Lüge): Trump and
Putin and others lie as if they were not lying; only that this depositioning has
nothing to do with a messianic crisis of power. On the contrary, it serves as an
unreserved exhibition of entirely mundane power with all its presumptuousness
and ruthlessness. Therefore, linguist RuthWodak is right when she states that our
age is less a “post-factual age” than an “age of shamelessness”: “Shameless lies are
brought into the world […] without negative sanctions, even without apologies.”9
In other words, we are in a situation where truth claims are simply ignored,
because apparently, they can be simply ignored.
It would undoubtedly be too simplistic to assume (as some do or have already
done) that poststructuralism is the ideology of neoliberal capitalism, which in
theory dismantles all obligations in order to unleash the unrestricted play of
powers and forces in practice. Nevertheless, it seems that poststructuralist dis-
course has contributed to the age of shamelessness by rejecting, like the current
autocrats, all claims to truth in favor of a practice of depositioning. I am thinking
here once again of Derrida!s early “affirmation of the play of the world […], the
affirmation of signs without fault, without truth”10, as well as his later, often
repeated proclamation of the abysmal separation from truth, according to which
every presumed truth is at best a deceptive surface phenomenon. One can also
9 Wodak, Ruth, “Die Medien haben Kurz mitgemacht”, in: FALTER 51–52/2017,
own translation.
10 Derrida, Jacques,Writing andDifference, London /NewYork, Routledge 2005, 369.
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think of Foucault!s replacement of truth by “games of truth”, which are not about
“the discovery of true things but the rules according to which what a subject can
say about certain things depends on the question of true and false.”11 But what
about those subjects who consciously prefer the false to the true? FromFoucault!s
perspective, there is nothing to prevent the answer: they!re not lying, they!re just
changing the rules of the game on their own accord. In a remarkable way they
resemble the subject of Foucault!s later philosophy, a subject that transforms itself
in such a way that “it cannot find itself again in a form that can be described as the
effect of an external power.”12 Don!t we meet here exactly the contemporary
autocrats who, after many personal transformations, are finally independent of
any external power? One might think of the winding lives of a Putin or Trump.
There ismuch to suggest that characters like these two have every right to feel like
the sovereign masters of an “aesthetic of existence;” hardly according to the
intention of postmodern theory, but still according to the result.
Faced with these masters of the world and their shameless lies, I believe it is
time to reinvigorate a discourse of truth. Truth here is primarily not to be un-
derstood as a formal-semantic problem, or amatter of truth-apt statements, but as
something that concerns the core of human life. In other words, from the per-
spective suggested here, truth is only in a secondary sense an epistemological
category but basically an ethical one.
This is actually not so far removed from Foucault!s “parrhesia.” However, I
would like to add a material element, while Foucault!s approach remains merely
formal. Since truth has to do with what is really the case, a discourse of truth is
inevitably linked to a discourse of reality. Indeed, one can say that truth can only
be thought of under the condition of a strong notion of reality. Reality is to be
understood accordingly as that which exceeds all relativizations.
In the following I would like to outline elements of such a discourse that
progressively binds truth and reality together. In contrast to poststructuralism, the
basic thesis is that the real cannot be substituted by signs. Rather, according to this
approach, the real has its own force; because it has its own force, it is able to
represent itself, i. e. to reject certain signs as well as to demand them. The ethical
dimension of truth relates to this claim for appropriate signs. There is an imper-
ative of the real. The real demands us to be true; true in a threefold sense: in the
sense of fidelity, precision, and sincerity.
Note that from this perspective, the representation – “true signs” – that the real
demands of us lies before the separation of subject and object, which applies to
classical representation theory. Accordingly, the real is not to be understood as an
11 Foucault, Michel, “Foucault”, in: Foucault, Michel, Essential Works, Vol. II, New
York, The New Press 1998, 460.
12 Saar, Martin, “Die Form des Lebens. Künste und Techniken des Selbst beim späten
Foucault”, in: Foucault, Michel, Die Ästhetik der Existenz. Schriften zur Lebenskunst,
Berlin, Suhrkamp 2007, 321–343, here: 336. Own translation.
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objective counterpart to whomwe direct ourselves. Rather, we should conceive of
it as a movement that lets us be, just like all things, by leading us beyond what we
are at present in a dynamic vertical sense. In fact, the real is so little at our disposal
that in the final analysis, it could be said that false signs make us perish in the flow
of the real, while true signs will save us.
3. The Emperor!s New Clothes
Let us start with an exemplary case, namely Hans Christian Andersen!s fairy tale
The Emperor!s New Clothes, which is actually a parable. There!s an emperor who
loves beautiful clothes. One day two fraudsters come to the city and promise him
clothes of exquisite quality. However, they say whoever is stupid or unfit for their
office cannot see the clothes. The emperor orders the clothes immediately, not
least to test his highest officials. The fraudsters begin to weave the supposed
clothes, but they take the silk provided for this purpose themselves and weave
with nothing. Since the clothes consist of nothing, neither the officials, who are to
supervise the progress of the work, nor the emperor himself can see the clothes.
But since neither of them wants to be considered stupid or incapable, they don!t
admit this. Rather, they pretend to be enthusiastic about the beauty of the clothes.
To break the spell of deception, which is supported by everyone, it finally takes a
little child; “the voice of the innocent [den uskyldiges røst],” as Andersen writes.
During the public presentation of the emperor!s new clothes, the child exclaims:
“But he has nothing on at all [men han har jo ikke noget p$.]!” Andersen!s fairy
tale ends with a literal and very democratic uncovering of the logic of power:
“#But he has nothing on at all!! cried the whole people at last. That made a deep
impression upon the emperor, for it seemed to him that they were right; but he
thought to himself, #Now Imust bear up to the end.!And the chamberlains walked
with still greater dignity, as if they carried the train which did not exist.”13
Andersen!s fairy tale very clearly refutes Foucault!s assumption that it is games
of truth that decide what is true or false and what exists or does not exist ac-
cordingly.Of course, the fraudsters whoweavewith nothing and pass off the result
of their weaving art as something are playing a game of truth. They create a
situation of speech – of “veridiction”, as Foucault calls it – in which the emperor,
his officials and at first also the people declare existent what does not exist. Yet
this truth game, which is actually about deception and self-deception, cannot be
persevered. However, the reason is not, as the late Foucault apparently assumes,
13 In Andersen!s original text, it reads: “#Han har jo ikke noget p%!! r%bte til sidst hele
folket. Og det krøb i kejseren, thi han syntes, de havde ret, men han tænkte som s%: #num%
jeg holde processionen ud!. Og s% holdt han sig endnu stoltere, og kammerherrerne gik og
bar p% slæbet, som der slet ikke var.” Andersen, Hans-Christian: The Emperor!s New
Suit.
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that individual members of society change in such a way that the rules of the game
of truth also change. Rather, the situation changes abruptly in Andersen!s fairy
tale and through an intervention from the outermost edge of society, where other
games, not truth games, are played. From the perspective of the child, the socially
constituted meanings are irrelevant. They collapse in on themselves and the truth
emerges: the emperor is naked. There are no new clothes.
There can be no doubt that the case fromAndersen!s fairy tale is a very simple
case, and there are undoubtedly cases that are not so easy to resolve. The question
of what gender designations really refer to is a good example. It is therefore
advisable to distinguish exactly from case to case. Nevertheless, there seems to be
an excessive remainder, an overflowing surplus of the real, even in cases that are
overdetermined by a game of truth, so to speak, and where meanings seem to
result solely from discursive construction. For instance, and to stick to the ex-
ample, when people cannot bear their gender role, when they suffer from it, and at
least know “I!m not a woman/I!m not a man.”
Let me pursue this thought. In fact, the question of the real seems to be exactly
about this surplus. It is something that evades signs and meanings; yet it aims at
the sign, the true sign, to show that it itself, the real, is there. The next section will
focus on three aspects of a phenomenology of the real to support this notion.
4. A Short Phenomenology of the Real
I speak of a phenomenology of the real because, following Heidegger!s early
fundamental ontology, or hermeneutic phenomenology, I assume that what we
are dealing with, the “things” or phenomena, is “that which shows itself in itself”14
and accordingly “shows itself from itself.”15 It is another matter that phenom-
enological thinking, including Heidegger, has not adequately addressed the self-
giving of phenomena for a long time. Jean-Luc Marion!s writings have seminal
significance not least against this background.
Three aspects then. First aspect: As noted, under the wrong discursive con-
ditions, the real appears as an excessive remainder, an overflowing surplus. A
primary indicator of this is that the real appears as resistance against what misses
the real itself, be it the wrong discourse or the wrong interpretation or the wrong
sign. It follows from this resistance that the wrong is always connected with an
effort. The wrong must constantly assert itself against the resistance of the real,
and this constant coercion to ignore what is real is eating away at the wrong or at
those who support it. One could certainly show this, albeit in a more detailed
discussion, for the wrong that arises from lack of wit or inattentiveness. The
simplest and clearest example, however, is exactly what interests us, namely lies.
14 Heidegger, Martin: Being and Time, Oxford, Blackwell 2001, 51.
15 Heidegger, Being and Time, 58; my emphasis.
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In this case we can even refer to Nietzsche, who wrote about the lie inHuman, All
Too Human: “Why do people almost always tell the truth in everyday life? –
Certainly not because a god has forbidden lying. But […] because it is easier; for
lies inquire inventiveness, dissimulation, and memory […] anyone who tells a lie
seldom notices the heavy burden that he has taken on; in order to maintain a lie,
he must invent twenty others.”16 The force of the real extends to the point where
lies make people sick. People suffer psychophysically from lies, especially if they
support the lies against their own will. Or, to name another case, political tyranny
with its dishonesty and compulsion to conceal destroys entire societies.
The resistance of the real is important not least because it contradicts the
poststructuralist reductionism of all that concerns us into the signifier. The re-
sistance of the real against the lie shows: something is pervading our lives, which is
not constituted by signs. Rather, it works independently in the signs, also in such a
way that it works against the signs when they distort it. The trace is not, asDerrida
suggests, “the origin of the origin” of what was actually never there.17 Rather, it
indeed points to something; something one can even call the “thing itself.”
However, – the second aspect – how shouldwe understand the “thing itself”? In
fact, I agree with Derrida and others that a simple metaphysics of presence is
misleading. This refers both to the notion that our ideas are based on fixed things
or substances as well as that the real is what is fully indicated by concepts. I will
expand on the relationship of the real to concepts in the last section. Let us note at
this juncture that the resistance of the real nevertheless points to the fact that what
appears to us – the phenomenal, the phenomena – has a “self”. On the one hand,
the self stands for the fact that what is given to us – or rather, what has given itself
to us – is not arbitrary or interchangeable. An example ex negativo: Only a bad
language, the language of clich*, describes one phenomenon in such a way that it
cannot be distinguished from the other. On the other hand, the resistance of the
real indicates that hermeneutics is limited.One phenomenon cannot be all that an
interpretation requires of it. Rather, there is a limit towhat a phenomenon can be;
even if “we do not even know what a body can do”18 or what the limit of the
phenomenon is. The limit is determined by the phenomenon itself. To refer once
again to Andersen!s parable: what is woven of nothing will never be a dress; even
if there may be ways – ways of seeking one!s own advantage, rather than artisti-
cally showing the invisible – to stage it as a dress.
16 Nietzsche, Friedrich: Human, All Too Human. A Book for Free Spirits, The Com-
plete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, Vol. 3, Standford, Standford University Press 1995,
57. Tellingly, Nietzsche!s subsequent view on children!s relationship to lies is less positive
than that of Andersen.
17 See Derrida, Jacques: Of Grammatology, Baltimore / London, John Hopkins
University Press 1976, 61.
18 Deleuze, Gilles: Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, San Francisco, City Lights Books
1988, 17–18.
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One can conclude from this that the self of phenomena is characterized by its
own insistence. In other words, phenomena insist on themselves, while giving
themselves. They can never be completely appropriated. This insistence also
implies that phenomena can hold out, that they cannot be destroyed by false truth
games. Rather, they can only be repressed, covered up, or suppressed.
Accordingly, one could say that phenomena in the wake of insistence also have
a certain consistency and continuity. Thus, even if it is not true that phenomena are
based on or refer to fixed substances, one can speak of themas specific somethings
in the sense that phenomena appear to us as manifestations of the history of a
consistent movement.
If it was said above that the real is a movement that points us, or rather, beings
in general beyond themselves in a vertical sense, this can be specified here. The
reality of something is the movement of its realization – in constant struggle with
the distortions that are part of the process of appearing. The future of this
movement is open to us, yet it is not arbitrary. That is, it is the future of this
appearing thing, of this very phenomenon. However, the impulse for how the
phenomenon appears lies with the phenomenon itself. It is the impulse of its
realization beyond itself. Therefore, we can never dispose of a phenomenon.
This implies that a phenomenon may suddenly turn out to be different, even in
a radical sense. The real brings about an abundance of consistent yet changing,
even eventful phenomenal effects that neitherwe nor, for thatmatter, anonymous
systems of signification can ever fully exploit. While for us this is an indication of
the surplus character of the real, every event, even unforeseen transformation, is
consistent within the framework of the history of realization of the real.
The third aspect is related to this. It would not be enough to understand the
insistence, consistency and continuity of phenomena purely negatively as some-
thing that shows itself in resistance against false truth games. Rather, phenomena
have their own impetus. Even on the level of immediate aisthesis, which is poor in
interpretation, it can be seen that phenomena are guiding action on their own
initiative. Their formandmaterial imply a project (Entwurf) that can considerably
expand our possibilities for action. Yet it also specifies what these possibilities
look like.Note in passing thatHeidegger!s famousZeuganalyseofBeing andTime
significantly ignores this point because it places too much emphasis on human
practical circumspection (Umsicht); a point to which neo-realist authors such as
Markus Gabriel or Graham Harman have also referred.19 However, if we can
reasonably assume that phenomena have their own impetus and project, and that
they demand certain actions, it is obvious that they also demand certain signs;
signs that do justice to them. It is because of this demanding impetus of phe-
19 See Gabriel, Markus: “Is Heidegger!s #Turn! a Realist Project?”, in: META: Re-
search in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy, Special Issue, 2014,
44–73; Harman, Graham: Tool-Being. Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects, Chi-
cago / La Salle, Open Court 2002.
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nomena that words can have liberating or even redemptive power. In the fol-
lowing I will speak of the solving (lösende) quality of words, which echoes both
their liberating and redemptive power.
5. The Solving Word and the Dynamics of the Real
Again, we can think back to Andersen. The cry of the child “he has nothing on at
all” abruptly ends both deceit and self-deception.However hard the chamberlains
try to keep up the lie – no matter how much dignity they show while carrying the
non-existent train – the real has found the solving word (das lösende Wort). Im-
portantly, the searching for and finding of the solving word originates from the
real itself. Andersen shows this in an exemplary way. The child pronouncing the
solving word has not been looking for it. Precisely because it is innocent, as
Andersen writes, it reveals the real without claiming anything, let alone the truth
of truth games. Accordingly, one could say that the child is not a subject of speech.
Rather, it is the medium of the searching of the real for the solving word. This is
essential to distinguish it from Foucault!s veridiction.
My reservations concerning the traditionalmetaphysics of presence can also be
specified by recourse to the solving word. The crucial point seems to be that it is
not a concept. Concepts resemble signs in that they treat phenomena as sub-
stitutable. Concepts, for their part, apply a general form to phenomena that turns
them into cases among others. By contrast, the solving word refers to phenomena
as individuals that cannot be substituted. Consequently, the solving word is not
supratemporal as concepts pretend to be.Rather, it is related to the real, insofar as
the real is coming to be in time. The solvingword gives presence to the phenomena
in the sense that they can show themselves from themselves. Thus, it releases them
from those games of truth that distort them. However, this is still related to
temporality. The solving word indicates that phenomena can be transient and yet
truthful. Phenomena are truthful in that, in finite situations, they can find the signs
that allow them to show themselves from themselves.
This relationship of signs, phenomena and time also has consequences for the
relationship between the solvingword and games of truth. The solvingword never
completely leaves the truth games behind. It takes place among them and thus it
remains revisable; not because it becomes untrue, but because it itself creates a
new truth game. To put it more simply: The solving word opens a different view of
the world, it creates a new situation. Yet in this new situation there will be other
distorted realities searching for the true sign or solvingword. There is no complete
transparency under the finite circumstances in which we live. However, this is not
to relativize reality and truth. It simply means that there is no total, all-encom-
passing representation of the real.
Reality is a surplus movement (Überschussbewegung), thanks to which single
phenomena can show themselves from themselves as undistorted; that is, against
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the distortions that are the rule in a world without complete transparency. This
also implies a demand on us that we can speak. The real calls for the trans-
formation of ourselves in such a way that we move into the position of the me-
dium; that we take on passage-like agency, creating space for phenomena to show
themselves from themselves. We are called to devotion to phenomena, to accu-
racy and precision, while we are dealing with them. The point is to enter into the
dynamics of the real under conditions that tend to be dominated by the fascination
of that which is woven of nothing, of empty signs, in a word, the unreal. We must
begin creating processes of the real.
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